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INTRODUCTION 
The advent of the Lisbon Treaty brought among numerous 
changes, a provision which explicitly now allows Member States 
to withdraw from the European Union. While some scholars 
have begun to examine the provision,1 it is surprising that they 
are analyzing the clause in isolation. Yet, if one had to categorize 
the concept of withdrawal, most likely, it would fall into the 
camp of disintegrating provisions, which therefore are in stark 
contrast with any provisions that could be considered as 
integrating norms; an obvious example for this latter category 
                                                                                                                                     
* Faculty Academic Fellow, School of Law, University of Lancaster. I am grateful to 
Associate Professor in Law Tawhida Ahmed, em. Professor Sandy Ghandhi and 
Professor Steven Wheatley for comments on an earlier draft; all errors, of course, 
remain mine. The author can be contacted at c.rieder@lancaster.ac.uk. 
1. See, e.g., Anna Wyrozumska, Withdrawal from the Union, in THE EUROPEAN UNION 
AFTER LISBON: CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS, ECONOMIC ORDER AND EXTERNAL ACTION 343 
(Hermann Josef Blanke & Stelio Mangiameli eds., 2012); Hannes Hofmeister, ‘Should I 
Stay or Should I Go?’—A Critical Analysis of the Right to Withdraw from the EU, 16 EUR. L.J. 
589 (2010). 
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would be EU citizenship. The claim that is made in this Article is 
that in order to fully understand the application and the 
functioning of the withdrawal clause, it is necessary to 
accommodate the tensions between integration and 
disintegration—between ‘citizenship’ and ‘withdrawal.’ 
The withdrawal clause comes at a time when it seems no 
longer unthinkable for a Member State to ‘reduce’ membership 
obligations or even completely withdraw from the European 
Union. The case of the United Kingdom is interesting in two 
ways: first, in his speech on Europe, Prime Minister David 
Cameron promised an in-or-out referendum on EU 
membership;2 one can take this as an example of voluntary loss 
of EU membership. The case of Scotland, on the other hand, 
would be an example of involuntary loss of membership; 
Scotland has announced a referendum about its independence 
from the United Kingdom, which is scheduled for 2014.3 One 
aspect of the discussion for and against independence is 
whether Scotland could remain an EU Member State.4 
Apart from these rather extreme and maybe exceptional 
cases mentioned above, it seems, as Piris points out, that “the 
time is approaching when the choice will be between the status 
quo, which might mean a diluted European Union, slowly 
stagnating and becoming irrelevant, and a European Union that 
accepts, as a temporary measure, more differentiation between 
its Member States.”5 The withdrawal clause may have its role to 
play in this process. If this is so, and keeping in mind the two 
above examples, it is necessary to clearly define the normative 
and doctrinal limits of this clause. 
                                                                                                                                     
2. U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron, Speech Regarding Referendum on British 
Membership in the European Union (Jan. 23, 2013), available at http://
www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2013/jan/23/david-cameron-eu-speech-referendum. 
3. Severin Carrell, Alex Salmond Announces Scottish Independence Referendum Date, 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 21, 2013, 2:55 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2013/mar/
21/scottish-independence-referendum-date. 
4. Cf. James Crawford & Alan Boyle, ANNEX A OPINION: REFERENDUM ON THE 
INDEPENDENCE ON SCOTLAND—INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS (2013), available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/794
08/Annex_A.pdf; Scottish Independence: EC’s Barroso Says New States Need ‘‘Apply to Join 
EU”, BBC NEWS (Dec. 10, 2012, 3:11 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-
scotland-politics-20664907. 
5. JEAN-CLAUDE PIRIS, THE FUTURE OF EUROPE: TOWARDS A TWO-SPEED EU? 147 
(2012). 
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The only ‘test case’ of complete ‘withdrawal’ that exists at 
this point is the rather special case of Greenland, which stems 
from the mid-1980s. When the Danish electorate decided to 
accede to the European Union, the people of Greenland 
opposed that move, but nevertheless had to follow because they 
were part of the Danish territory. Yet, over the years, what was to 
be observed was a form of devolution that took place in which 
powers were transferred from Denmark back to Greenland 
culminating in a 1982 referendum concerning whether 
Greenland was to remain within the European Union.6 It is 
worth pointing out that the subsequent request to ‘withdraw’ 
from the European Union was not made by Greenland itself, but 
by Denmark in order to renegotiate the application of the 
Treaties to its territory;7 needless to say, Member States were 
rather sensitive with regard to Greenland’s wishes given the 
colonial context.8 
Despite the case above, generally there has always been a 
debate as to whether withdrawal from the European Union is 
possible at all under EU law. Heated discussions also took place 
in the Constitutional Convention, which drafted the withdrawal 
clause originally for the Constitutional Treaty. 9  There were 
delegates who saw withdrawal as acceptable according to the 
principles of international law, and those who considered 
withdrawal incompatible with EU law in general. One viewpoint 
that represented the conservative or traditional side was 
expressed by the delegate of the Austrian Government, Hannes 
Farnleitner, who argued that “[t]he provisions of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties provide a sufficient basis for 
termination of membership.”10 On the other side, there were 
delegates such as the representatives of the Dutch government 
who pointed out “that facilitating the possibility to withdraw 
                                                                                                                                     
6. MICHAEL SWEITZER ET AL., EUROPARECHT: DAS RECHT DER EUROPÄISCHEN 
UNION 37 (2007) (Ger.). 
7. Wyrozumska, supra note 1, at 343–44. 
8. Raymond J. Friel, Providing a Constitutional Framework for Withdrawal from the EU: 
Article 59 of the Draft European Constitution, 53 INT’L. & COMP. L.Q. 407, 409–11 (2004). 
9. Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe art. I-60, 2004 O.J. C 310/1, 
at 40 (never ratified) [hereinafter Draft Constitutional Treaty]. 
10. Hannes Farnleitner, Suggestion for Amendment of Article I-59, available at 
http://european-convention.eu.int/Docs/Treaty/pdf/46/46_Art%20I%2059%20
Farnleitner%20EN.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2013).  
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from the Union [was] contrary to the idea of European 
integration as set out in the preamble of the TEU [which]: 
‘[r]esolved to continue the process of creating an ever closer 
union among the peoples of Europe’.”11 Despite that discussion, the 
clause not only made it into the failed Constitutional Treaty but 
was one of the provisions which was preserved and transplanted 
into the Lisbon Treaty as the new article 50 of the Treaty of the 
European Union (“TEU”).12 
This paper is pragmatic with regard to the question as to 
whether the withdrawal clause should exist at all in the first 
place. The question is, ‘Who should stop a Member State willing 
to cut off ties completely with the EU?’ Nevertheless, the 
argument is normative when it comes to the question of ‘how 
the withdrawal clause has to be understood or applied?’—this is 
a question that clearly has implications on a future relationship 
between the withdrawn Member State and the European Union. 
In order to develop the argument, this Article first identifies the 
principles of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the 
“Vienna Convention”) with regard to withdrawal.13 Second, this 
Article will discuss the withdrawal clause of the Lisbon Treaty 
itself. In the last section, this Article will add the issue of 
citizenship to the discourse on withdrawal, and it will evaluate 
whether this has any implications on how withdrawal by a 
Member State can be executed. 
I. WITHDRAWAL UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
This first section will outline the parameters of withdrawal 
under international law. Despite the fact that there now exists a 
specific provision on withdrawal within the EU framework, it is 
nevertheless useful to briefly provide an overview of the 
withdrawal framework under international law, and identify its 
                                                                                                                                     
11. G.M. de Vries & T.J.A.M. de Bruijn, Suggestion for Amendment of Article : 46, 
available at http://european-convention.eu.int/Docs/Treaty/pdf/46/art46vriesEN.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 5, 2013).  
12. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 50, 2012 O.J. C 
326/13, at 43–44 [hereinafter TEU]. The Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty 
Establishing the European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community, Including Protocols and Annexes, will be referred to as the “Lisbon 
Treaty” throughout this Article.   
13. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
[hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
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guiding principles such as the role of state-sovereignty or 
whether unilateral withdrawal from a treaty is possible. After all, 
the conceptual ideas between ‘withdrawal’ on the international 
and the European level are the same; withdrawal allows for a 
state to exit a treaty. 
Section 3 of the Vienna Convention offers detailed and 
numerous provisions on the specific question of “Termination 
and Suspension of the Operation of Treaties.” For the purposes 
of this Article, the focus will be on two specific articles: (1) 
article 54, which stipulates withdrawal from a treaty either 
through its own provisions or by consent among the parties of 
the treaty; and (2) article 56, which regulates withdrawal from a 
treaty if there exists no provision in the treaty and if no consent 
can be reached among the parties involved. The core difference 
between these two provisions seems to be that where article 54 is 
based on a form of “consensualism,” this dimension is absent in 
article 56.14 
As pointed out, article 54 of the Vienna Convention allows 
for withdrawal from a treaty if this is agreed by the parties. This 
agreement or consensus can come in two ways: first, consent of 
the parties with regard to withdrawal or termination can be 
expressed in the treaty itself through a specific clause, but must 
be “in conformity with the provisions of the treaty.”15 As a 
consequence, at one point in the drafting history, the provision 
was removed. In the final version, however, the clause was 
included once again “for the sake of clarity.”16 Article 50 of the 
TEU, the withdrawal clause of the Lisbon Treaty, is such a 
specific provision. 
Second, article 54 of the Vienna Convention also allows for 
a more ad hoc termination of, or withdrawal from, a treaty. After 
all, a treaty can be terminated or a party can withdraw from one 
“[a]t any time by consent of all the parties after consultation with 
the other contracting States.”17 The obvious question to ask for 
                                                                                                                                     
14. Theodore Christakis, Article 56, 1969 Vienna Convention, in 2 THE VIENNA 
CONVENTIONS ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 1251, 1252–53 (Olivier 
Korten & Pierre Klein eds., 2011). 
15. Vienna Convention, supra note 13, art. 54(a), at 344. 
16 . Vincent Chapaux, Article 54, 1969 Vienna Convention, in 2 THE VIENNA 
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY, supra note 14, at 1236, 1238.  
17. Vienna Convention, supra note 13, art. 54(b), at 345 (emphasis added). 
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the purposes of this Article is whether this provision, in light of 
the Lisbon Treaty, is now superfluous. With regard to 
termination, an argument can certainly be made that the Lisbon 
Treaty has no specific provisions and therefore article 54 still has 
its role to play. 
The second provision that this Article will examine is article 
56 of the Vienna Convention. The norm seems to “establish[] a 
general presumption against unilateral denunciation.” 18  The 
Article stipulates that “[a] treaty which contains no provision 
regarding its termination and which does not provide for 
denunciation or withdrawal is not subject to denunciation or 
withdrawal.”19 What is firmly established is that “[t]he customary 
character of the ban on unilateral denunciation, enunciated as a 
matter of principle in the introductory phrase of the first 
paragraph of Article 56, is beyond doubt.”20 To offer a rather 
extreme example: not even Hitler’s Germany invoked a right of 
unilateral withdrawal, but argued instead that the other parties 
to the Treaty of Versailles were in breach of their obligations.21 
However, the provision also offers two exceptions: first, 
withdrawal is possible if “the parties intended to admit the 
possibility of denunciation or withdrawal;”22 and second, “a right 
of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied by the nature of the 
treaty.”23 
Withdrawal based on the intention is relatively undisputed 
as a concept of customary law. None of the participating states at 
the Sixth Committee or at the Vienna Conference opposed this 
provision.24  Also, whenever unilateral withdrawal became an 
issue there was no discussion of “whether paragraph 1(a) 
reflected the state of customary law, but the manner in which 
the intention of the parties was to be assessed in each particular 
case.”25 At the same time the concept is notoriously difficult to 
                                                                                                                                     
18. Christakis, supra note 14, at 1257. 
19. Vienna Convention, supra note 13, art. 56.1, at 345. 
20. Christakis, supra note 14, at 1255. 
21. See id. at 1262. 
22. Vienna Convention, supra note 13, art. 56.1(a), at 345 (emphasis added).  
23. Id. art. 56.1(b), at 345 (emphasis added). 
24. See Christakis, supra note 14, at 1255–56. 
25. Id. at 1256. 
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establish given the fact that “intention” indicates a “subjective 
element”26 which has an exclusive internal dimension. 
However, as indicated, withdrawal is also possible if it is in 
the “nature of the treaty.” Whether this is the case or not—at 
least in theory—can be established “objectively.” At the same 
time, the status of article 56.1(b) as a norm of customary 
international law seems far more questionable. This provision, 
which was sponsored by the United Kingdom, made it into the 
treaty at a very late stage of the negotiation process and was only 
passed by a rather narrow majority. “Given this legislative 
history, it is not surprising that the doctrine, almost 
unanimously, continues to doubt the customary character of 
paragraph 1(b) of Article 56.”27 
The German Bundesverfassungsgericht, which sits in 
Karlsruhe and is the enfant terrible of European integration, 
upheld the right to unilateral withdrawal in its Maastricht 
decision with what seems to be a distant resemblance of the 
ideology of “Blood (Volk) and Soil (Staat).” 28  In their 
judgement,29 the judges quite clearly articulated that “Germany 
is one of the ‘Masters of the Treaties’ who expressed their will to 
be bound by the indefinitely concluded EU treaty and in this 
way established a long lasting membership, which however can be 
dissolved by an act to the contrary.”30 The judges justified their 
conclusion by making reference to “state-sovereignty”;31 in light 
                                                                                                                                     
26. Id. at 1266. 
27. Id. at 1256. 
28. Joseph H.H. Weiler, Does Europe Need a Constitution? Demos, Telos and the 
German Maastricht Decision, 1 EUR. L.J. 219, 223 (1995). For a critical discussion of the 
Maastricht judgment, see Jochen A. Frowein, Das Maastricht-Urteil und die Grenzen der 
Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, 54 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND 
VÖLKERRECHT 1 (1994). 
29. Although, as Weiler notes, not without irony, “[r]ecently [the court] decided 
that its judges should be referred to in English as ‘Justices.’ Priceless!” Joseph. H.H. 
Weiler, Editorial, Judicial Ego, 9 INT’L. J. CONST. L. 1, 2 (2011). 
30. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 12, 
1993, 89 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 155 (para. 
112) (Ger.) (“Deutschland ist einer der ‘Herren der Verträge’, die ihre Gebundenheit 
an den ‘auf unbegrenzte Zeit’ geschlossenen Unions-Vertrag . . . mit dem Willen zur 
langfristigen Mitgliedschaft begründet haben, diese Zugehörigkeit aber letztlich durch 
einen gegenläufigen Akt auch wieder aufheben könnten.” (emphasis added) (author’s 
own translation)). 
31. Id. (“Deutschland wahrt damit die Qualität eines souveränen Staates . . . .”). 
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of the above, such a claim seems far less persuasive than 
suggested by the judges.32 
This is not to argue that sovereignty has no role to play, but 
it is only relevant when a state makes a decision either to join or 
remain outside a treaty framework; state sovereignty makes the 
decision a voluntary one.33 This means, however, that “there is 
nothing shocking in the idea that States, which are not forced to 
enter into a treaty regime, may have difficulty leaving it.”34 If one 
accepts this reasoning, then sovereignty does not necessarily 
“impl[y] an inalienable right”35 to withdraw even if unilateral 
withdrawal may be considered to be an expression of 
sovereignty. What follows from all of these considerations is that 
a state which decides to withdraw unilaterally acts against 
international law unless it can invoke other justifications for 
doing so. Thus, sovereignty alone does not offer a sufficient and 
solid enough normative basis. 
What is to be concluded from all of these considerations? 
Sovereignty, as a concept, does not seem normatively persuasive 
to justify unilateral withdrawal. Therefore, the argument made 
by the German Constitutional Court that an actus contrarius is 
sufficient to absolve a state from the obligations under the 
Treaty is not convincing. Nevertheless, sovereignty has a role to 
play as it serves as a safeguard which guarantees that a state is 
either free to join a treaty or not; in other words, it injects the 
voluntary element at the beginning of a contractual 
relationship. Thus, an argument can be made that a form of 
metamorphosis takes place once a state has joined a treaty, which 
leads to a limitation of possibilities once joined. The following 
section will now move the analysis from the general provision of 
withdrawal under international law to the lex specialis of the 
Lisbon Treaty. 
                                                                                                                                     
32. Frowein, supra note 28, at 11. 
33. DJURA NINČIĆ, THE PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CHARTER AND IN THE 
PRACTICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 26 (1970). 
34. Christakis, supra note 14, at 1264. 
35. Hans Kelsen, Withdrawal from the United Nations, 1 W. POL. Q. 29, 33 (1948). 
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II. WITHDRAWAL UNDER EU LAW 
Withdrawal from the European Union is regulated in 
article 50 of the TEU. What is rather obvious to notice is that the 
matter of withdrawal is dealt with in only one single and rather 
short provision. This somehow seems surprising given the 
significance and complexity of a potential withdrawal from the 
European Union. The wording of the clause can be considered 
‘rather broad’ as it allows not only for consensual, but also for 
unilateral, withdrawal. This section will outline the structure of 
the provision and highlight some of its problems before it is 
discussed in the light of EU citizenship in the next section. 
According to article 50.1 of the TEU, “[a]ny Member State 
may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its 
own constitutional requirements.”36 The problem one encounters 
with this provision is that it would seem that it is the European 
Court of Justice (“ECJ”) which would be called on to decide 
whether a Member State (rebus sic stantibus) has in fact 
withdrawn in accordance with its own constitutional 
requirements. This means, as a consequence, that “this insertion 
has catapulted that court [ECJ] into the role of final arbiter of a 
significant issue of national constitutional law.”37 Needless to say, 
this could embroil the ECJ in questions which are highly 
sensitive for the withdrawing Member State. 
Secondly, it remains rather unclear what the phrase means 
for Member States which have an integration-friendly 
constitution, such as Germany. The Preamble of the German 
Basic Law reads that “[c]onscious of their responsibility before 
God and man, [i]nspired by the determination to promote 
world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe, the German 
people, in the exercise of their constituent power, have adopted 
this Basic Law.”38 In its Solange II ruling, the judges of the 
German Constitutional Court acknowledged that provisions in 
                                                                                                                                     
36. TEU, supra note 12, art. 50.1, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 43 (emphasis added).  
37. Friel, supra note 8, at 425. But see Wyrozumska, supra note 1, at 359 (“Friel’s 
[sic] fears seem, however, unsupported by the Treaty provisions and the ECJ case law. 
The ECJ has no competence under the Lisbon Treaty to adjudicate upon validity of the 
internal law procedures in similar situations, and the Court was consequently rejecting 
its competence in similar cases.”). 
38. GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] 
[BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I, pmbl. (Ger.). 
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the German Basic Law need to be interpreted in relation to each 
other (“normativen Sinneinheit”)39 and this includes a reading of 
constitutional provisions also in the light of the Preamble. 
Following this reasoning, it seems rather questionable how a 
complete withdrawal from the European Union could be 
justified. It appears that the German Constitutional Court either 
deliberately abandoned or was oblivious of this reasoning in its 
Maastricht decision. 
A second condition, according to article 50.2 of the TEU, 
which needs to be fulfilled by the withdrawing member state, is 
that it has to “notify the European Council of its intention.”40 
What follows then “[i]n the light of the guidelines provided by 
the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude 
an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its 
withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future 
relationship with the Union.”41 A reading of the provision, so 
far, seems to suggest that a Member State can leave the 
European Union only in a consensual way. This finding, 
however, as will be shown below, needs to be qualified. 
The agreement to be concluded between the withdrawing 
state and the Council, which acts on behalf of the European 
Union according to Article 50.2 “acting by a qualified majority, 
after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament,” has to 
follow the procedure as outlined in Article 218.3 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”).42 Thus, 
whereas the agreement about withdrawal is to be concluded 
between the European Union and the respective member 
state,43 the accession treaty, according to Article 49 of the TEU, 
is one “between the Member States and the applicant State.”44 
Again one could make reference to the concept of metamorphosis 
taking place between accession and withdrawal. 
                                                                                                                                     
39. Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Nov. 5, 
2012, 73 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVERFGE] 339 (¶ 131) 
(Ger.). 
40. TEU, supra note 12, art. 50.2, 2012 O.J. C 326, at 43. 
41. Id. (emphasis added). 
42. See id. (“[The agreement for withdrawal] shall be negotiated in accordance 
with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.”). 
43. See Jochen Herbst, Observations on the Right to Withdraw from the European Union: 
Who Are the “Masters of the Treaties”?, 6 GERMAN L.J. 1755, 1758 (2005). 
44. TEU, supra note 12, art. 49, 2012 O.J. C 326, at 43. 
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It may be worth pointing out, especially in the light of later 
normative considerations, that the ECJ has a role to play in 
examining this agreement because it forms part of EU law.45 The 
jurisdiction of the Court comes in two ways: as judicial review 
and in the form of an Opinion. With regard to the former, 
Lazowski points out that “the decisions on signature and 
approval of the agreement may be subject to judicial review”46 
according to article 263 of the TFEU. With regard to the latter, 
article 218.11 of the TFEU entitles Member States, the EU 
Parliament, Council, or Commission to request an Opinion 
from the ECJ as to whether the agreement concluded is in line 
with Treaty requirements.47 
If an agreement is finally reached, according to article 50.3 
of the TEU, “[t]he Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in 
question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal 
agreement.”48 At the same time, however, the provision also 
allows for a unilateral withdrawal if, two years after the 
notification, no agreement can be reached.49 The time period, 
which can also be extended by the European Council in an 
agreement with the withdrawing Member State, has positive and 
negative aspects. On the positive side one could argue that a 
two-year period can allow for a ‘cooling off’; on the other hand, 
the time span leads to uncertainty and potential blackmailing. 
One cannot rule out that a Member State could threaten 
with a form of “putative withdrawal.”50 This would amount to 
nothing more than a theatre on the supranational stage for a 
national audience which, however, puts a heavy burden on the 
EU institutions and their capacity to solve problems. There are 
also concerns that the automatism at the end of the two-year 
time frame may undermine serious talks for an agreement 
because the withdrawing Member State knows that “after 2 years 
                                                                                                                                     
45. See Adam Lazowski, Withdrawal from the European Union and Alternatives to 
Membership, 37 EUR. L. REV. 523, 528 (2012). 
46. Id. 
47. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union art. 218.11, 2012 O.J. C 326/47, at 146 [hereinafter TFEU] (“Where the opinion 
of the Court is adverse, the agreement envisaged may not enter into force unless it is 
amended or the Treaties are revised.”). 
48. TEU, supra note 12, art. 50.3, 2012 O.J. C 326, at 44. 
49.  See id. 
50. Friel, supra note 8, at 426. 
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withdrawal will take effect in any event.”51 However, invoking the 
“principle of sincere cooperation” in article 4.3 of the TEU as a 
safeguard runs into the usual difficulties of substantiating the 
raised claims sufficiently.52 
Another crucial aspect which is addressed in article 50.4 of 
the TEU is the question of how to deal with the representatives 
of the withdrawing Member State within the institutional 
framework of the European Union. The provision states that 
“the member of the European Council or of the Council 
representing the withdrawing Member State shall not participate 
in the discussions of the European Council or in decisions 
concerning it.” 53  The provision is clear and also seems 
conceptually sound: according to article 10.2 of the TEU, 
“Member States are represented in the European Council by 
their Heads of State or Government and in the Council by their 
governments, themselves democratically accountable either to 
their national Parliaments, or to their citizens.”54 Members in 
the (European) Council thus represent the citizens/nationals of 
the state and therefore their primary concern, especially in the 
critical circumstances of a withdrawal process, is located with the 
state. 
The provision, however, is silent about the status of MEPs 
from the withdrawing Member State. Hofmeister seems to be 
rather critical of the logical conclusion that MEPs continue to be 
allowed in the decision making process, even if related to 
withdrawal; he is also rather concerned that they may influence 
the decision-making process in a certain way.55 However, he 
appears to be oblivious to the conceptual role of the EU 
Parliament which is to “directly [represent citizens] at Union 
level”; 56  or as Dougan phrased it: “directly elected MEPs 
represent the collective interests of Union citizens rather than 
the parochial interests of the withdrawing state.” 57  Despite 
                                                                                                                                     
51. Id. 
52. Cf. Commission v. Netherlands, Case C-96/81, [1982] E.C.R. I-1791. 
53. TEU, supra note 12, art. 50.4, 2012 O.J. C 326, at 44. 
54. Id. art. 10.2, at 20. 
55. See Hofmeister, supra note 1, at 594. 
56. TEU, supra note 12, art. 10.2, 2012 O.J. C 326, at 20. 
57. Michael Dougan, The Convention’s Draft Constitutional Treaty: A ‘Tidying-Up 
Exercise’ that Needs Some Tidying-Up of Its Own, 27 FED. TR. CONST. ONLINE PAPER SERIES 
1, 8 (2003). 
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Dougan’s acknowledgement of the institutional role of 
parliament, he nevertheless argues against their inclusion in the 
process as he seems more concerned that “national loyalties of 
its MEPs . . . take precedence over the general Union interest 
they were originally elected to represent.”58 However, one will 
always face the problem that some representatives of an 
institution understand and accept the role of the institution they 
are serving, whereas others will not. 
In turn, an argument could be made that allowing MEPs to 
still participate in the process of withdrawal limits the violation 
of a “key tenet of democratic theory”59 that is “the principle of 
affected interests.”60 The principle requires that “[e]veryone 
who is affected by the decisions of a government should have 
the right to participate in that government.”61 The argument to 
be made is that because MEPs are elected by EU citizens, this 
allows nationals from other EU Member States who are living on 
the territory of the withdrawing state to have at least some 
representation in the political process of withdrawal; this would 
alleviate the problem that they may be excluded from the 
national political process/discourse of withdrawal. 
It should be noted that article 50.5 of the TEU also allows 
the withdrawing Member State to rejoin. 62  In such a case, 
however, the state would have to follow the normal procedure 
for accession according to article 49 of the TEU. This means 
that, first of all, a member state has no automatic right to rejoin 
and, second, that it would have to take over the complete acquis 
communautaire. As a consequence, any previous opt-outs would 
be lost unless they can be renegotiated again.63 
                                                                                                                                     
58. Id. 
59 . Chris Hilson, EU Citizenship and the Principle of Affectedness, in MAKING 
EUROPEAN CITIZENS: CIVIC INCLUSION IN A TRANSNATIONAL CONTEXT 56, 56 (Richard 
Bellamy et al. eds., 2006). 
60. See ROBERT A. DAHL, AFTER THE REVOLUTION? AUTHORITY IN A GOOD SOCIETY 
49 (Yale Univ. Press rev. ed. 1990). 
61. Id. 
62. TEU, supra note 12, art. 50.5, 2012 O.J. C 326, at 44 (“If a State which has 
withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request shall be subject to the procedure 
referred to in Article 49.”). 
63.  See ALINA KACZOROWSKA, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 26–27 (3d ed. 2013). 
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What can be concluded is that the withdrawal clause allows 
for both unilateral as well as consensual withdrawal. It is clear 
that although the normative arguments to be made in the 
subsequent section are of little practical value, they are still of 
moral value if a Member State is determined enough to 
withdraw unilaterally. The normative dimension, more likely, 
will translate into a practice in case of consensual withdrawal 
executed through an agreement. These normative principles, 
which will be identified in the following section, describe the 
outer limits, or red lines, not to be overstepped in an agreement 
concluded by the European Union with a withdrawing Member 
State. In addition, the fact that the ECJ can be involved in 
reviewing the concluded agreement between the European 
Union and the withdrawing Member State may help to translate 
these normative principles—what ought to be—into reality—
what is. 
III. WITHDRAWAL AND EU CITIZENSHIP 
The previous section outlined the structure and some of 
the legal problems of the withdrawal clause, which can be 
described as a provision of disintegration. This section will 
examine the withdrawal clause in the context of citizenship—a 
concept that resembles integration. What is to be examined is 
whether this link between ‘withdrawal’ and ‘EU citizenship’ 
must lead to a different understanding of the withdrawal clause 
compared to that suggested in the previous section and 
literature so far. An obvious consequence of withdrawal from 
the European Union is a loss or change of the individual’s status 
as an EU citizen. Therefore in this section, a three-step 
argument will be developed. The first subsection examines the 
status of the individual in EU law. The second subsection focuses 
on the question of whether involuntary loss of citizenship can be 
normatively justified on the national level; this, it can be argued, 
simulates, mutis mutandi, the situation after withdrawal. The final 
subsection analyzes whether the findings made with regard to 
involuntary loss of national citizenship can in fact be transferred 
from national citizenship to EU citizenship. 
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A. The Role of the Individual in EU Law 
The argument which is made throughout this section is that 
the individual has a role to play in the process of withdrawal. 
This is achieved by treating the individual like a ‘subject’ and 
not  a mere ‘object.’ What can be observed in European 
integration is a continued strengthening of the status of the 
individual, starting almost from the very beginning, which found 
its focal point later, with the introduction of EU citizenship in 
the Maastricht Treaty.64 Ever since the formal introduction of 
EU citizenship the ECJ has further shaped and, one could 
probably argue, strengthened, the concept of EU citizenship. 
For the purposes of this Article, there is no need to rehearse the 
case law history.65 This subsection will focus exclusively on the 
role and status of the individual in EU law. 
As early as 1963, the Court was already laying the 
foundation for later developments with regard to the status of 
the individual in EU law and the role of sovereignty of Member 
States in the famous case van Gend en Loos. 66  The Court 
highlighted how the European Economic Community (“EEC”) 
Treaty moves beyond a traditional international law agreement 
among sovereign states, by making reference to the preamble of 
the treaty “which refers not only to governments but to peoples.”67 
Therefore, the exercise of power of these institutions “affects 
Member States and . . . their citizens.”68 Clearly, the EEC law 
acknowledged, from a very early point onwards, the existence of 
individuals as a distinct entity. What is noteworthy, however, is 
that while individuals were acknowledged as ‘subjects’ at this 
early stage of integration, citizens were exclusively defined 
through Member States and still clearly ‘belonged’ to the 
Member States as ‘their citizens.’ 
                                                                                                                                     
64. Treaty on European Union (Maastricht text), July 29, 1992, art. 8, 1992 O.J. C 
191/1, at 7 [hereinafter Maastricht TEU]. 
65. For a summary of this development, see Dimitry Kochenov, The Present and the 
Future of EU Citizenship: A Bird’s Eye View of the Legal Debate (Jean Monnet Program, 
Working Paper No. 02, 2012), available at http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/
papers/12/1202.html. 
66. Van Gend & Loos v. Neth. Inland Revenue Admin., Case 26/62, [1963] E.C.R. 
I-3 (English special edition). 
67. Id. at 12 (emphasis added). 
68. Id. (emphasis added). 
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What goes hand in hand with this development is a change 
in the understanding of the nature of EU law. The Court in van 
Gend en Loos concluded that “the Community constitutes a new 
legal order of international law.”69 One year later, in Costa, one 
finds an even more daring Court that already contrasts EU law 
with international law: “[b]y contrast with ordinary international 
treaties, the EEC Treaty has created its own legal system.”70 In 
Opinion 1/91, the Court went even further and held that the 
(then) EEC treaty “constitutes the constitutional charter of a 
Community based on the rule of law.”71 
Given this change of terminology away from the 
‘international’ to the more ‘national,’ it does not come as a 
surprise that eventually this development led to the introduction 
of citizenship in article 8.1 EC of the Maastricht Treaty. This 
provision was originally rather bold as it read that “[c]itizenship 
of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the 
nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union.”72 
The subsequent Amsterdam Treaty added the sentence that 
“[c]itizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace 
national citizenship.”73 This addition foreshadowed, but also 
should settle, potential tensions between the national and the 
supranational level. At the same time, an argument can be made 
that EU citizens were mainly defined through the nation state. 
The failed Constitutional Treaty is interesting because, so it 
seems, citizens finally stepped out of the shadow of the Member 
States. The Preamble, for example, read that the Convention 
prepared the draft “of this Constitution on behalf of the 
citizens.”74 Furthermore, article I-1 of the Constitutional Treaty 
spoke of the “will of the citizens and States of Europe to build a 
common future.”75 It almost seems to be an allusion to the idea 
of a ‘social contract’ where there are three parties involved in 
                                                                                                                                     
69. Id. (emphasis added). 
70. Costa v. ENEL, Case 6/64, 1964 E.C.R. I-587, 593 (emphasis added) (English 
special edition). 
71. Opinion 1/91, 1991 E.C.R. I-6099, 6102 (emphasis added). 
72. Maastricht TEU, supra note 64, art. 8.1, 1992 O.J. C 191, at 7. 
73. Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties 
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, 1997 O.J. C 340, at 
25 [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam]. 
74. Draft Constitutional Treaty, supra note 9, pmbl., 2004 O.J. C 310, at 3.  
75. Id. art. I-1, at 11. 
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the process that are presumably of equal weight: citizens, 
Member States, and the Union. 
However, with the Lisbon Treaty the language used by the 
Treaties becomes more careful again. Article 1 of the TEU once 
again refers exclusively to the “High Contracting Parties” which 
establish a Union “among themselves.” And, once again, we 
learn about the “process of creating an ever closer union among 
the peoples of Europe.”76 Thus, it almost seems that the clear 
language of the social contract which was still applied in the 
Constitutional Treaty is now absent again. Nevertheless, it is 
interesting to note a change or sharing of “possession” of 
citizens takes place where they are no longer considered to 
belong exclusively to the Member States but also to the 
European Union. Of course, with Weiler one could ask whether 
it should not be the case that it is “Europe which belongs to 
citizens”;77 this, however, is another discussion. 
Article 3.1 of the TEU nevertheless suggests a more direct 
link between the Union and its citizens: “[t]he Union’s aim is to 
promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples.”78 In 
addition, article 3.2 of the TEU establishes that “[t]he Union 
shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice 
without internal frontiers.”79 Article 13.1 of the TEU prescribes 
that “[t]he Union shall have an institutional framework which 
shall aim to promote its values, advance its objectives, serve its 
interests, those of its citizens and those of the Member States.”80 This 
provision clearly suggests that there is a distinction to be made 
between citizens on the one hand, and Member States on the 
other. 
What can be concluded is that the individual has a rather 
strong and a unique role in EU law compared to international 
law. This finding is also confirmed by the reasoning of the Court 
which does not consider EU law as an element of (traditional) 
international law. Member States accommodated this different 
approach by eventually introducing the concept of EU 
                                                                                                                                     
76. TEU, supra note 12, art. 1, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 16. 
77. Joseph H.H. Weiler, To Be a European Citizen–Eros and Civilization, 4 J. EUR. 
PUB. POL’Y 495, 500 (1997). 
78. TEU, supra note 12, art. 3.1, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 17 (emphasis added).  
79. Id. art. 3.2, at 17 (emphasis added).  
80. Id. art. 13.1, at 22 (emphasis added).  
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citizenship, which somehow crystallizes this development even if 
the legislative history shows a certain uneasiness with the 
concept of citizenship on the supranational level. The next 
subsection will discuss the possibility of involuntary loss of 
citizenship on the national level which may serve as a simulation 
for the loss of EU citizenship after withdrawal from the 
European Union. 
B. The (Involuntary) Loss of Citizenship 
The point to be made in this subsection is that “citizenship 
is a Stand, a status”81 of the individual within or opposite the 
collective, which, because of its fundamental importance, 
cannot be simply taken away by the majority. In this regard the 
protection of the status of citizenship is rather different 
compared to one, admittedly extreme, example of the forced 
removal of citizenship within living history—the Nazi treatment 
of some of their citizens; Jews, for example, were regularly 
stripped of this crucial status before they were killed in the 
concentration camps.82 So, an argument can be made that even 
the Nazis acknowledged the importance of the status as such 
even though they did not hesitate to carry out such acts as they 
did. 
The US Supreme Court developed a position which 
highlighted the role of citizenship as conferring a status on the 
individual. Chief Justice Warren stated in Perez v. Brownell that 
[c]itizenship is man’s basic right for it is nothing less than 
the right to have rights. . . . In this country the expatriate 
would presumably enjoy, at most, only the limited rights and 
privileges of aliens, and like the alien he might even be 
subject to deportation and thereby deprived of the right to 
assert any rights.83 
The ECJ in Grzelczyk equally seems to acknowledge the 
importance of the status of citizenship; even if, given its civil law 
tradition, in far less prosaic words: “Union citizenship is 
                                                                                                                                     
81. ROGERS BRUBAKER, CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONHOOD IN FRANCE AND GERMANY 
62 (1992). 
82. Id. at 167–68. 
83. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64–65 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) 
(citations omitted). 
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destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the 
Member States . . . .” 84  There seems to be a considerable 
overlap between the ECJ’s and US Supreme Court’s 
understanding of the role of citizenship as an instrument that 
establishes status. 
Loss of citizenship can come in two ways: either people lose 
citizenship with their consent (voluntary) or without consent 
(involuntary). Whether both are equally permissible has been 
the discussion of a series of judgments by the US Supreme 
Court. The principles developed by the Court may be worth 
outlining for the purposes of this Article as they may provide a 
useful (normative) guideline also for the EU context. The case 
of Mackenzie v. Hare 85 offers aspects for both dimensions, even 
if, as will be seen, the judgment stretches the word ‘voluntary’ by 
any means.86 According to the relevant law at the time, an 
American woman, Ms. Mackenzie, lost her citizenship as a 
consequence of marriage with a British man. Yet Ms. Mackenzie 
claimed that “such legislation, if intended to apply to her, is 
beyond the authority of Congress.”87 One of the arguments 
made to support her case was that citizenship “became a right, 
privilege, and immunity which could not be taken away from her 
except as a punishment for crime or by her voluntary 
expatriation.”88 
The US Supreme Court, however, was not sympathetic to 
Ms. Mackenzie and found the law which deprived her of 
citizenship to be constitutional because the legislature did not 
act arbitrarily, and also considered the loss of citizenship in this 
case as one to be “elected.”89 In the eyes of the Court, the case 
therefore came under the heading of “voluntary expatriation.”90 
The extent to which ‘consent’ as a concept may be stretched, 
however, is open for discussion; one could make the argument 
that consent also has a role to play in the context of loss of 
citizenship following withdrawal, if one considers the following: 
                                                                                                                                     
84. Grzelczyk v. Centre public d’aide sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve, Case C-
184/99, [2001] E.C.R. I-6139, ¶ 31. 
85. Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915). 
86. Cf. Comment, The Expatriation Act of 1954, 64 YALE L. J. 1164, 1179 (1955). 
87. 239 U.S. at 307. 
88. Id. at 308. 
89. Id. at 312. 
90. Comment, supra note 86, at 1171 & n.36.  
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withdrawal is a consequence of a political process, and, 
therefore, one could argue that at least a majority has consented 
to withdrawal and hence their loss of citizenship. 
The argument, however, is not without problems for at least 
two groups of people. The first group consists of people who 
were entitled to vote, but said explicitly ‘no’ to withdrawal; in 
this context it seems difficult to construct a form of ‘implied’ or 
‘indirect’ consent. The second category consists of either people 
who are excluded from the political process because they are 
not citizens of the withdrawing member state, but are still 
affected because they live on the territory; or they are simply too 
young to be entitled to participate in the political deliberation 
process.91 What, from a normative perspective, is particularly 
problematic is that it is not only impossible to construct 
‘consent’ as a justifying means with regard to the loss of 
citizenship but in addition for the second group of people they 
also experience a violation of the “principle of affectedness”;92 
as has been pointed out already this principle is rather crucial in 
democratic theory. 
Originally the US Supreme Court in Mackenzie based its 
decision not only on the consent argument, but also made it 
clear that the US Congress has the power to revoke citizenship 
even against the will of a person. The Court concluded that the 
US Congress, in fact, has these powers, at least to the extent “as 
a ‘necessary and proper’ incident to its ‘sovereign’ power in the 
area of foreign affairs.”93 The US Supreme Court similarly found 
that the US Congress has the power to deprive a person of the 
citizenship status against their will in Perez v. Brownell.94 If this 
were to be the normatively convincing approach then, as a 
consequence, people in these two groups described above would 
have no case because they could be deprived of their status 
anyway—even against their will. The argument would end here. 
                                                                                                                                     
91. This is particularly problematic because it is especially young people who are 
more in favor of European integration. See Eurobarometer, 72 Nationaler Bericht: 
Österreich 32 fig. (2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/
eb/eb72/eb72_at_at_nat.pdf. 
92. See Hilson, supra note 59, at 56. 
93. Comment, supra note 86, at 1177. 
94. See 356 U.S. 44 (1958). 
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What is interesting to note, however, is that Chief Justice 
Warren, in his dissenting opinion in Brownell developed a rather 
different conceptual understanding of citizens and citizenship. 
He made the point that 
[C]itizens themselves are sovereign, and their citizenship is not 
subject to the general powers of their government. 
Whatever may be the scope of its powers to regulate the 
conduct and affairs of all persons within its jurisdiction, a 
government of the people cannot take away their citizenship 
simply because one branch of that government can be said 
to have a conceivably rational basis for wanting to do so.95 
What this means, in other words, is that the individual is 
protected against the decision of a majority. However, in Afroyim 
v. Rusk, the US Supreme Court overruled its findings in Perez v. 
Brownell, and followed the reasoning outlined by Chief Justice 
Warren ten years earlier. 96  A similar problem in a slightly 
different context is also to be found in the rather recent 
examples of separation having taken place in Europe.97 The 
solution seems to be very much in line with the principle of “the 
sovereign citizen” identified by Chief Justice Warren. Despite 
the fact that a majority had voted in favor of separation in the 
case of Czechoslovakia, the legal framework put in place allowed 
for the individual to make a choice of which citizenship to 
adopt; article 3(2) of the Charter on Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms allowed Czechs and Slovaks to choose their own 
nationality following the dissolution of Czechoslovakia: 
“[e]verybody has the right freely to choose his nationality. It is 
prohibited to influence this choice in any way.” 98  Another 
example would be Opinion No. 2 of the Badinter Arbitration 
Committee at the conference on Yugoslavia which also 
recommended that individuals ought to have the nationality of 
                                                                                                                                     
95. Id. at 65 (emphasis added). 
96. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967). 
97. I am grateful to Dr. James Summers for providing me with these two 
examples. 
98. Ústavní zákon č 2/1993 Sb., Listina Základních Práv a Svobod [Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms] art. 3(2) (Czech), translated in Parliament of 
the Czech Republic, Chamber of Deputies, Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic 
Freedoms, available at http://www.psp.cz/cgi-bin/eng/docs/laws/1993/2.html. 
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their choice;99 again, despite a majority decision, the individual 
should have the last say on their individual status. 
If one transfers the gist of the argument from Chief Justice 
Warren’s reasoning that “citizens themselves are sovereign”100 
and “a government of the people cannot take away their 
citizenship,”101 this effectively limits the room for maneuver of a 
government. One reaches a similar conclusion also when 
drawing on examples of European self-determination. If one 
takes these principles out of the state context and applies them 
in the context of withdrawal from the European Union, what 
one would need to conclude is that a Member State 
(government) could not simply strip people of EU citizenship 
against their will. This, however, would mean that even if a 
majority of people in a referendum may be in favor of withdrawal 
from the European Union, a way would nevertheless need to be 
found to accommodate the right of individuals to retain EU 
citizenship if they wanted to. The next subsection will analyze 
whether it is possible to apply the reasoning made with regard to 
national citizenship in the context of EU citizenship. 
C. The (Involuntary) Loss of EU citizenship 
As outlined in the previous section, one obvious 
consequence of withdrawal is that according to article 50.3 of 
the TEU (at one point) “[t]he Treaties shall cease to apply.”102 
As such, article 20 of the TFEU, which confers on the individual 
person EU citizenship, shall also “cease to apply.” This, however, 
means that a person will lose the status which is conveyed on 
them through EU citizenship. This subsection will analyze 
whether a similar reasoning as with national citizenship ought to 
apply or whether different principles are at stake here. In order 
to be able to address this question, the relationship between 
national and EU citizenship needs to be analyzed. The specific 
aspect which needs to be discussed is whether EU citizenship has 
the potential or capacity to somehow stand alone. 
                                                                                                                                     
99. See Alain Pellet, The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second 
Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples, 3 EUR. J. INT’L L. 178, 184 (1992). 
100. Perez, 356 U.S. 44, 65 (1958). 
101. Id. 
102. TEU, supra note 12, art. 50.3, 2012 O.J. C 326, at 44. 
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A starting point for analyzing the relationship between 
national and EU citizenship is to be found in the conclusions of 
the Edinburgh Council Meeting of December 1992, where it was 
highlighted that EU citizenship gives ‘additional rights’ but does 
not replace national citizenship.103 How is this to be interpreted? 
Denmark in the Annex to the Treaty made the following 
declaration: “[c]itizenship of the Union is a political and legal 
concept which is entirely different from the concept of citizenship 
within the meaning of the Constitution of the Kingdom of 
Denmark and of the Danish legal system.”104 However, it seems 
that not much is to be gained apart from the conclusion drawn 
from this declaration, other than that EU citizenship differs 
from national citizenship. 
In Rottmann, 105  Advocate General Maduro found that 
national and EU citizenship “are both inextricably linked and 
independent.”106 Lippolis, in turn, argues with regard to their 
relationship that they are “interlinked and not separable”;107 
and he continues that “[t]he national citizenship is the primary 
and original status, whereas the European citizenship which 
derives from it, is a secondary citizenship. This means that being 
a European citizen does not entitle one to become a citizen of one of 
the Member States”;108 one could argue that this understanding 
of EU citizenship exclusively defined through national 
citizenship upholds ideas of state-sovereignty. 
This finding is relatively unproblematic and coincides with 
the wording of article 20 of the TFEU: “[c]itizenship of the 
Union is hereby established. Every person holding the 
nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union.”109 
Clearly this provision focuses on the creation of EU citizenship, 
which seems closely related to national citizenship. However, the 
                                                                                                                                     
103. Edinburgh European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, E.C. BULL., no. 
456, at 53 (1992). 
104. Denmark and the Treaty on European Union (Annex 3) art. 1, 1992 O.J. C 
348/1, at 4 (emphasis added). 
105. Rottmann v. Bayern, Case C-135/08, [2010] E.C.R. I-1467. 
106. Opinion of Advocate General Maduro, Rottmann v. Bayern, Case C-135/08, 
[2010] E.C.R. I-1452, ¶ 23. 
107. Vicenzo Lippolis, European Citizenship: What It Is and What It Could Be, in 3 
EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP: AN INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE 317, 318 (Massimo La Torre 
ed., 1998). 
108. Id. (emphasis added). 
109. TFEU, supra note 47, art. 20, 2012 O.J. C 326, at 56. 
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problem of this Article is not so much the ‘creation’ but the 
‘loss’; and here the Treaty as well as the literature seems to be 
rather silent. This may not come as a surprise as withdrawal from 
the European Union (and therefore loss of EU citizenship) has 
(deliberately) remained unaddressed, specifically when EU 
citizenship was introduced by the Maastricht Treaty. 
The closest EU law and the ECJ have come to dealing with 
the specific question on the loss of EU citizenship was in the 
case of Rottmann. Rottmann, originally an Austrian citizen, lost 
Austrian citizenship as a consequence of taking up German 
citizenship, which he subsequently lost as he failed to disclose 
on-going criminal investigations of serious fraud in Austria 
during his naturalization in Germany; for Rottmann this would 
result in loss of his status as an EU citizen.110 The German 
Federal Administrative Court sent, with another question, the 
following query to the ECJ: 
must the Member State . . . which has naturalised a citizen 
of the Union and now intends to withdraw the 
naturalisation obtained by deception, having due regard to 
Community law, refrain altogether or temporarily from 
withdrawing the naturalisation if or so long as that 
withdrawal would have the legal consequence of loss of 
citizenship of the Union (and of the associated rights and 
fundamental freedoms) . . . , or is the Member State . . . of 
the former nationality obliged, having due regard to 
Community law, to interpret and apply, or even adjust, its 
national law so as to avoid that legal consequence?111 
All the Court had to say in this context was “that the 
withdrawal of naturalisation acquired by the applicant in 
Germany [had] not yet become definitive, and that no decision 
concerning his status [had] been taken by the Member State 
whose nationality he originally possessed, namely, the Republic 
of Austria.”112 However, even if the Court had developed more 
on this question it would still somehow differ from the 
withdrawal situation: if a Member State withdraws from the 
European Union, the question is not necessarily what happens 
to national citizenship, but instead to EU citizenship. In other 
                                                                                                                                     
110. Rottmann, [2010] E.C.R. I-1467, ¶¶ 22–27, 46, 59. 
111. Id. ¶ 35.2. 
112. Id. ¶ 61. 
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words one could argue that Rottmann only describes an indirect 
loss of EU citizenship (through the loss of national citizenship), 
whereas withdrawal potentially leads to a direct loss of 
citizenship. The question is, however, whether an argument can 
be made that EU citizenship has an element of independence? 
The first draft of article 5 of the Constitutional Treaty—
ironically called in German, “das Gerippe” or the skeleton—
originally spoke of “dual citizenship,” 113  which subsequently 
changed during negotiations to “Citizenship of the Union shall 
be additional to national citizenship and shall not replace it,”114 a 
wording which was also kept in article 20 of the Lisbon Treaty. 
The word “additional” means “added,” ”other,” “more,” but 
also “another”;115 but it also means that both “entities” at one 
point can exist independently from each other. Kostakopoulou 
comes to a similar conclusion when she argues that “the true 
meaning of ‘additionality’ or ‘complementarity’ or ‘existing 
alongside’ [delineates] a degree of relative autonomy and, by no 
means, [implies] that A and B cannot function apart.”116  
It comes as a surprise when reading the highly controversial 
Maastricht decision of the German Constitutional Court, which 
clearly stated that unilateral withdrawal is possible through an 
actus contrarious, that the same court found that, “as a 
consequence of EU citizenship introduced by the Maastricht 
Treaty a durable legal bond is to be established amongst 
nationals of the Member States.”117 It is interesting to note that 
the Constitutional Court uses a different wording in the context 
of citizenship compared to withdrawal, where it invoked the 
                                                                                                                                     
113. Preliminary Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe art. 5, 2002, 
CON 369/02 (never ratified) (emphasis added). 
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somehow ‘weaker wording’ of the Treaty itself from article Q of 
the TEU, which stated that the Treaty is concluded for auf 
unbegrenzte Zeit or ‘an unlimited time.’118  
In turn, when the German judges discussed the nature of 
citizenship they used a different terminology to emphasize that 
citizenship is a ‘durable’ or ‘permanent’ bond (‘auf Dauer’). Any 
references to termination are missing but what is found instead 
is a remark that EU and national citizenship differ only in the 
“density of the bond.”119 It almost seems as if the German 
Constitutional Court acknowledged the importance of the status 
conveyed through EU citizenship. The possible (unintended) 
consequence of this difference is that EU citizenship appears to 
be more robust than the Treaty which established this concept. 
The argument to be made in this section was that one has 
to distinguish between conditions under which one is entitled to 
national citizenship and therefore EU citizenship, which is still 
very much in the autonomous hands of Member States, and 
circumstances where one loses EU citizenship either because of 
loss of national citizenship (as was the case in Rottmann) or 
because of withdrawal (national citizenship is retained but is no 
longer considered a nationality of a Member State). None of the 
Member States were forced to confer the status of EU 
citizenship on their citizens but once they have, according to 
this argument, they cannot simply withdraw this status. 
Furthermore, EU citizenship, like national citizenship, 
conveys an important status. After all, EU citizenship “is 
required in order to preserve the link between the citizen and 
the Union and his/her place in the European community of 
citizens.” 120  Thus, this means that the normative reasoning 
employed in the context of national citizenship also applies with 
regard to EU citizenship. If this is so, then one of the 
fundamental principles established in this section, that 
citizenship cannot simply be taken away through a majority 
decision, especially against the will of the individual, must apply 
unless the entity of the Union would cease to exist, in which 
case, the ‘link’ would no longer be needed. 
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CONCLUSION 
A consequence of the argument developed in this Article is 
that one needs to distinguish between the individual and 
institutional level when it comes to the matter of withdrawal; 
whether this is at all possible will be addressed (at least 
cursorily) in this final concluding section. In this context, 
attention should be drawn to two examples: the ‘EU-Swiss 
model’ and the European Economic Area (“EEA”).121 Over the 
years, the EEA served as a form of “antechamber to EU 
membership for Austria, Sweden and Finland.”122 Therefore it 
seems in a way plausible to make an argument that the EEA 
could serve as an ‘exit-chamber’ for Member States which only 
want to participate in the internal market. Given the fact that 
there exists some sort of relationship between the European 
Union and members of the EEA, it appears de facto possible 
that individuals who do not wish to join their member state’s 
downscaling in membership, could remain in a closer 
relationship with the European Union. 
The EEA model follows the logic one-size-fits all, whereas 
the ‘EU-Swiss model,’123 is more tailored to the individual needs 
of the EU partner. Given the European Union’s experiences 
with the EU-Swiss model, however, it seems less likely to be an 
option in the future. 124  Switzerland could be considered a 
“‘quasi’ member state,”125 which has concluded several bilateral 
agreements with the EU; these agreements even go so far as 
Switzerland’s participation in the sovereignty-sensitive issue of 
immigration, asylum, police and judicial cooperation.126 Again, 
what one finds here is institutional cooperation without full-
fledged institutional integration; this, in turn, amounts to 
evidence that one can separate the institutional from the 
individual integration. The situation described in this Article, of 
course, would be the other way around. In this context, it would 
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be the individual who remains integrated and the institutional 
level which disintegrates. This certainly would make things less 
easy but it would necessarily mean that such an approach of 
divided integration could be possible. 
There might be a certain reluctance to understand 
citizenship and the political community detached from territory. 
One should not forget, however, that political communities in 
ancient Greek, the polis, were not first and foremost perceived 
as a community on a specific territory, but rather as a 
community of people. Therefore, as Ottmann points out, it was 
possible for Themistokles to relocate Athens on the ships; its 
identity was not to be found in its soil but constitution.127 One is 
strongly reminded of Habermas’ idea of constitutional 
patriotism.128 I think it would be quite apt to understand EU 
citizenship in this de-territorialized way; after all, countless wars 
have been fought for territory and in order to overcome and 
defend boundaries. The idea of European integration, however, 
is a reaction to the fatal consequences of the nation state that is 
built around these ingredients. 
In the 1960s, Leonard B Boudin’s article in the Harvard 
Law Review about the “Involuntary Loss of American 
Nationality” began with the following paragraph: “The relatively 
new concepts of nationality and nationalism may some day give 
way to systems of world law and world government. Until that 
time, problems of nationality, statelessness, and the rights and 
obligations of citizens will continue to arise in a world of 
independent nation-states.”129 European integration itself has 
always been at the forefront of changing our understanding of 
international law, and, once again, it could be the case that we, 
the citizens of Europe, may witness the next step in international 
law. 
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